Reports on the Shale Revolution rarely discuss its impact on U.S. energy security, but with little fanfare it's affording the U.S. greater geopolitical flexibility. The Administration's decision last week to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal was made without significant regard to the ensuing reduction in Iranian oil exports. Successive U.S. presidents back to Richard Nixon have called for U.S. energy independence without being able to achieve it. The U.S. is already energy independent on a BTU-equivalent basis (i.e. we produce more energy than we consume in aggregate). We became natural gas independent last year as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports ramped up. We've been a net exporter of ethane since 2014, and of propane since 2011.

But when a President calls for energy independence – or even energy dominance – he means crude oil. Here, the story is almost as good. In August 2006, net imports of crude oil and petroleum products hit 13.4 Million Barrels per Day (MMB/D). Today that figure is below 3 MMB/D. Even when the U.S. does become a net exporter we'll still be importing the sour, heavy crude favored by domestic refineries while exporting the lighter grades that are increasingly produced from shale.

Furthermore, our imports are increasingly from friendly countries. Canadian exports to the U.S. have been rising for years and are currently 4.3MMB/D, while OPEC imports have dropped by 50% in the past decade, to below 3 MMB/D. U.S. imports from Iran ceased entirely during the 1980 hostage crisis and have never recovered. In fact, total trade in goods between the U.S. and Iran was an inconsequential $200MM last year. While Iran is of no economic value to the U.S., the likely imposition of sanctions will constrain Iran's exports to other countries. The recent rally in crude is in part attributed to fears of less Iranian crude on the global market – they currently produce 3.8MMB/D.