Chinese exports rose 12.9% year-over-year in April 2018. Imports were up 20.9%. As always, both numbers sound impressive but they are far short of rates consistent with a growing global economy. China's participation in global growth, synchronized or not, is a must.
The lack of acceleration on the export side tells us a lot about what to expect on the import side. The one piece situated between Ex and Im is government interference, often in the form of “stimulus.” If exports are weak but officials make a concerted effort to offset that weakness, imports can perform marginally better. That can be good news for the rest of the global economy further down the supply chain (resources).
It can also be bad news for the Chinese. If global growth never does pick up in meaningful fashion, they are left on the hook (debt) for what was done anticipating it. We've all heard the narrative of rebalancing, that though the export sector may never fully come back (which would still be news to the Western world) China's growing middle class and its consumption will spell the difference.
That is happening, of course, but more so by accident or default; Chinese consumption is decelerating like everything else, just not as quickly as heavy industry and manufacturing. It's rebalancing but at a much lower level. We cannot ignore that key factor.
This kind of situation would propose a far more uncertain trajectory than the one where globally synchronized growth means something substantial, or at least where rebalancing toward consumerism wasn't a mere remainder. Again, China's trade statistics are consistent with the uncertainty, not the growth.
The lack of acceleration in and out of China's economy actually explains quite a lot about not just the global economy but also markets (including for “dollars”). As the world's largest consumer of resources, at the margins it's not even close, how much that country demands of the rest of the world determines the direction and the intensity.